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Abstract
Federated learning systems are vulnerable to at-
tacks from malicious clients. As the central server
in the system cannot govern the behaviors of the
clients, a rogue client may initiate an attack by
sending malicious model updates to the server, so
as to degrade the learning performance or enforce
targeted model poisoning attacks (a.k.a. backdoor
attacks). Therefore, timely detecting these mali-
cious model updates and the underlying attackers
becomes critically important. In this work, we pro-
pose a new framework for robust federated learn-
ing where the central server learns to detect and re-
move the malicious model updates using a powerful
detection model, leading to targeted defense. We
evaluate our solution in both image classification
and sentiment analysis tasks with a variety of ma-
chine learning models. Experimental results show
that our solution ensures robust federated learning
that is resilient to both the Byzantine attacks and
the targeted model poisoning attacks.
1 Introduction
Federated learning (FL) comes as a new distributed machine
learning (ML) paradigm where multiple clients (e.g., mobile
devices) collaboratively train an ML model without revealing
their private data [McMahan et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2019b;
Kairouz et al., 2019]. In a typical FL setting, a central server
is used to maintain a global model and coordinate the clients.
Each client transfers the local model updates to the central
server for immediate aggregation, while keeping the raw data
in their local storage. As no private data gets exchanged in
the training process, FL provides a strong privacy guarantee
to the participating clients and has found wide applications in
edge computing, finance, and healthcare [Yang et al., 2019a;
Li et al., 2019b; Li et al., 2019c].
FL systems are vulnerable to attacks from malicious
clients, which has become a major roadblock to their practical
deployment [Bhagoji et al., 2019; Bagdasaryan et al., 2019;
Wu et al., 2019; Kairouz et al., 2019]. In an FL system, the
central server cannot govern the behaviors of the clients, nor
can it access their private data. As a consequence, the ma-
licious clients can cheat the server by sending modified and
harmful model updates, initiating adversarial attacks on the
global model [Kairouz et al., 2019]. In this paper, we con-
sider two types of adversarial attacks, namely the untargeted
attacks and the targeted attacks. The untargeted attacks aim
to degrade the overall model performance and can be viewed
as Byzantine attacks which result in model performance de-
terioration or failure of model training [Li et al., 2019a;
Wu et al., 2019]. The targeted attacks (a.k.a. backdoor
attacks) [Bhagoji et al., 2019; Bagdasaryan et al., 2019;
Sun et al., 2019], on the other hand, aim to modify the behav-
iors of the model on some specific data instances chosen by
the attackers (e.g., recognizing the images of cats as dogs),
while keeping the model performance on the other data in-
stances unaffected. Both the untargeted and targeted attacks
can result in catastrophic consequences. Therefore, attack-
ers, along with their harmful model updates, must be timely
detected and removed from an FL system to prevent mali-
cious model corruptions and inappropriate incentive awards
distributed to the adversary clients [Kang et al., 2019].
Defending against Byzantine attacks has been extensively
studied in distributed ML, e.g., [Chen et al., 2017; Blan-
chard et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2018; Yin et al., 2018]. How-
ever, we find that the existing Byzantine-tolerant algorithms
are unable to achieve satisfactory model performance in the
FL setting. These methods do not differentiate the ma-
licious updates from the normal ones. Instead, they aim
to tolerate the adversarial attacks and mitigate their nega-
tive impacts with new model update mechanisms that can-
not be easily compromised by the attackers. In addition,
most of these methods assume independent and identically
distributed (IID) data, making them a poor fit in the FL sce-
nario where non-IID datasets are commonplace. Researchers
in the FL community have also proposed various defense
mechanisms against adversarial attacks [Sun et al., 2019;
Shen et al., 2016]. These mechanisms, however, are mainly
designed for the deliberate targeted attacks and cannot sur-
vive under the untargeted Byzantine attacks.
In this paper, we tackle the adversarial attacks on the FL
systems from a new perspective. We propose a spectral
anomaly detection based framework [Chandola et al., 2009;
Kieu et al., 2019; An and Cho, 2015] that detects the abnor-
mal model updates based on their low-dimensional embed-
dings, in which the noisy and irrelevant features are removed
whilst the essential features are retained. We show that in
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such a low-dimensional latent feature space, the abnormal
(i.e., malicious) model updates from clients can be easily dif-
ferentiated as their essential features are drastically different
from those of the normal updates, leading to targeted de-
fense.
To our best knowledge, we are the first to employ spec-
tral anomaly detection for robust FL systems. Our spectral
anomaly detection framework provides three benefits. First,
it works in both the unsupervised and semi-supervised set-
tings, making it particularly attractive to the FL scenarios in
which the malicious model updates are unknown and can-
not be accurately predicted beforehand. Second, our spectral
anomaly detection model uses variational autoencoder (VAE)
with dynamic thresholding. Because the detection threshold
is only determined after the model updates from all the clients
have been received, the attackers cannot learn the detection
mechanism a priori. Third, by detecting and removing the
malicious updates in the central server, their negative impacts
can be fully eliminated.
We evaluate our spectral anomaly detection approach
against the image classification and sentiment analysis tasks
in the heterogeneous FL settings with various ML models,
including logistic regression (LR), convolutional neural net-
work (CNN), and recurrent neural network (RNN) [Zhang et
al., 2020]. In all experiments, our method accurately detects
a range of adversarial attacks (untargeted and targeted) and
eliminates their negative impacts almost entirely. This is not
possible using the existing Byzantine-tolerant approaches.
2 Prior Arts
2.1 Robust Distributed Machine Learning
Existing methods mainly focus on building a robust aggre-
gator that estimates the “center” of the received local model
updates rather than taking a weighted average, which can be
easily compromised. Most of these works assume IID data
across all the clients (a.k.a. workers). So the local model up-
dates from any of the benign clients can presumably approx-
imate the true gradients or model weights. Following this
idea, many robust ML algorithms, such as Krum [Blanchard
et al., 2017], Medoid [Xie et al., 2018], and Marginal Me-
dian [Xie et al., 2018], select a representative client and use
its update to estimate the true center. This approach, while
statistically resilient to the adversarial attacks, may result in
a biased global model as it only accounts for a small fraction
of the local updates.
Other approaches, such as GeoMed [Chen et al., 2017] and
Trimmed Mean [Yin et al., 2018], estimate the center based
on the model updates from clients, without differentiating the
malicious from the normal ones. These approaches can mit-
igate the impacts of malicious attacks to a certain degree but
not fully eliminate them.
More recently, [Li et al., 2019a] introduces an additional
l1-norm regularization on the cost function to achieve robust-
ness against Byzantine attacks in distributed learning. [Wu
et al., 2019] proposes an approach that combines distributed
SAGA and geometric median for robust federated optimiza-
tion in the presence of Byzantine attacks. Both approaches
cannot defend against the targeted attacks.
2.2 Robust Federated Learning
The existing solutions for robust FL are mostly defense-based
and are limited to the targeted attacks. For example, [Shen
et al., 2016] proposes a detection-based approach for back-
door attacks in collaborative ML. However, it is assumed
that the generated mask features of the training data have the
same distribution as that of the training data, which is not the
case in the FL setting. [Sun et al., 2019] proposes a low-
complexity defense mechanism that mitigates the impact of
backdoor attacks in FL tasks through model weight clipping
and noise injection. However, this defense approach is unable
to handle the untargeted attacks that do not modify the mag-
nitude of model weights, such as sign-flipping attack [Li et
al., 2019a]. [Fang et al., 2019] proposes two defense mech-
anisms, namely error rate based rejection and loss function
based rejection, which sequentially reject the malicious local
updates by testing their impacts on the global model over a
validation set. However, as FL tasks typically involve a large
number of clients, exhaustively testing their impacts over the
validation set is computationally prohibitive.
2.3 Spectral Anomaly Detection
Spectral anomaly detection is one of the most effective
anomaly detection approaches [Chandola et al., 2009]. The
idea is to embed both the normal data instances and the ab-
normal instances into a low-dimensional latent space (hence
the name “spectral”), in which their embeddings differ signif-
icantly. Therefore, by learning to remove the noisy features
of data instances and project the important ones into a low-
dimensional latent space, we can easily identify the abnormal
instances by looking at reconstruction errors [An and Cho,
2015]. This method has been proved effective in detecting
anomalous image data and time series data [Agovic et al.,
2008; An and Cho, 2015; Xu et al., 2018; Kieu et al., 2019].
3 Spectral Anomaly Detection for Robust FL
In this section, we present a novel spectral anomaly detection
framework for robust FL.
3.1 Problem Definition
We consider a typical FL setting in which multiple clients col-
laboratively train an ML model maintained in a central server
using the FedAvg algorithm [McMahan et al., 2017]. We
assume that an attacker can only inspect a stale version of
the model (i.e., stale whitebox model inspection [Kairouz et
al., 2019]), which is generally the case in FL. We also assume
the availability of a public dataset that can be used for training
the spectral anomaly detection model. This assumption gen-
erally holds in practice [Li and Wang, 2019]. In fact, having a
public dataset is indispensible to the design of neural network
architecture in FL. We defer the detailed training process of
the spectral anomaly detection model to Section 4.2.
3.2 Impact of Malicious Model Updates
Before presenting our solution, we need to understand how
the adversarial updates may harm the model performance. To
this end, we turn to a simple linear model, where we quan-
tify the negative impacts of those malicious updates and draw
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Figure 1: LR model accuracy. Curves in the figure correspond to
different sum of weights attributed to malicious attackers.
key insights that drive our design. Consider a linear regres-
sion model yˆ = 〈w, x〉 with parameters w, data x, and loss
function ` = 12 (〈w, x〉 − y)2. We train the model using the
standard SGD solution wt+1 = wt− η∑Bj=1∇`(wt), where
wt is the parameter vector learned in the t-th iteration, B the
local batch size, and η the learning rate. Let wtk be the model
weight learned by the k-th client in the t-th iteration without
any malicious attacks. Let wˆtk be similarly defined subject
to attacks, where the malicious updates from the adversarial
clients are generated by adding noise ψ to the normal updates.
The following theorem quantifies the negative impact of ma-
licious updates.
Theorem 1. Let fa be the fraction of the total weights at-
tributed to the malicious clients, where 0 ≤ fa ≤ 1. We have
E[wˆt+1k ]−E[wt+1k ] = fa(E[ψ]−E
[
η
∑B
j=1〈ψ, xk,j〉xk,j
]
). (1)
We omit the proof of Theorem 1 due to the space con-
straint. Eq. (1) states that the impact of the malicious updates
is determined by two factors: (i) the noise ψ added by the
attackers, and (ii) the fraction of total weights fa attributed
to the malicious clients in an FL system. We further con-
firm these observations with simulation experiments shown
in Figure 1. With the same weights attributed to the mali-
cious clients in an FL system, sign-flipping attack (Figure 1b)
can cause more significant damage on the model performance
than adding random noises (Figure 1a). Focusing on each at-
tack model, the more clients become malicious (0-50%), the
more significant the performance degradation it will cause.
Considering that the noise ψ generated by the malicious
clients is unknown to the central server, the most effective
way of eliminating the malicious impact is to exclude their
updates in model aggregation, i.e., setting fa to 0. Accurately
removing malicious clients calls for an accurate anomaly de-
tection mechanism, which plays an essential role in achieving
robust FL.
Eq. (1) also suggests that adding a small amount of noise ψ
does not lead to a big deviation on the model weights. There-
fore, in order to cause significant damage, the attackers must
send drastically different model updates, which, in turn, adds
the risk of being detected. Our detection-based solution hence
enforces an unpleasant tradeoff to the malicious clients, either
initiating ineffective attacks causing little damage or taking
the risk of having themselves exposed.
3.3 Malicious Clients Detection
Following the intuitions drawn from a simple linear model,
we propose to detect the anomalous or malicious model up-
dates in their low-dimensional embeddings using spectral
anomaly detection [Chandola et al., 2009; An and Cho, 2015;
Kieu et al., 2019]. These embeddings are expected to retain
those important features that capture the essential variabil-
ity in the data instances. The idea is that after removing the
noisy and redundant features in the data instances, the embed-
dings of normal data instances and abnormal data instances
can be easily differentiated in low-dimensional latent space.
One effective method to approximate low-dimensional em-
beddings is to train a model with the encoder-decoder archi-
tecture. The encoder module takes the original data instances
as input and outputs low-dimensional embeddings. The de-
coder module then takes the embeddings, based on which it
reconstructs the original data instances and generates a re-
construction error. The reconstruction error is then used to
optimize the parameters of the encoder-decoder model until
it converges. Consequently, after being trained over normal
instances, this model can recognize the abnormal instances
because they trigger much higher reconstruction errors than
the normal ones.
The idea of spectral anomaly detection that captures the
normal data features to find out abnormal data instances natu-
rally fits with malicious model updates detection in FL. Even
though each set of model updates from one benign client may
be biased towards its local training data, we find that this shift
is small compared to the difference between the malicious
model updates and the unbiased model updates from central-
ized training, as illustrated in Figure 2. Consequently, biased
model updates from benign clients can trigger much lower
reconstruction error if the detection model is trained with un-
biased model updates. Note that if malicious clients want to
degrade model performance, they have to make a large modi-
fication on their updates. Otherwise, their attacks would have
a negligible impact on the model performance thanks to the
averaging operation of the FedAvg algorithm. Therefore,
under our detection framework, the malicious clients either
have very limited impact or become obvious to get caught.
We feed the malicious and the benign model updates into
our encoder to get their latent vectors, which are visualized
in Figure 2 as red and blue points, respectively. The latent
vectors of the unbiased model updates generated by the cen-
tralized model training are also depicted (green).
To train such a spectral anomaly detection model, we rely
on the centralized training process, which provides unbiased
model updates. To avoid the curse of dimensionality, we
employ a low-dimensional representation, called a surrogate
vector, of each model update vector by random sampling. Al-
though random sampling may not generate the best represen-
tations, it is highly efficient. Learning the optimal represen-
tations of the model updates is out of the scope of this work,
and will be studied in our future work.
3.4 Remove the Malicious Updates
After obtaining the spectral anomaly detection model, we ap-
ply it in every round of the FL model training to detect ma-
licious client updates. Through encoding and decoding, each
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Figure 2: 2D visualization in latent vector space. Green “Central-
ized” points are unbiased model updates. Blue “Benign” points are
biased model updates from benign clients. Red “Malicious” points
are malicious model updates from malicious clients. The attack of
malicious clients in the left figure is the additive noise attack over the
MNIST dataset. The attack of malicious clients in the right figure is
the sign-flipping attack over the FEMNIST dataset.
client’s update will incur a reconstruction error. Note that
malicious updates result in much larger reconstruction errors
than the benign ones. This reconstruction error is the key to
detect malicious updates.
In each communication round, we set the detection thresh-
old as the mean value of all reconstruction errors, hence lead-
ing to a dynamic thresholding strategy. Updates with higher
reconstruction errors than the threshold are deemed as mali-
cious and are excluded from the aggregation step. The ag-
gregation process only takes the benign updates into consid-
eration, and the weight of each benign update is assigned
based on the size of its local training dataset, the same as
that in [McMahan et al., 2017]. Note that the only difference
between our aggregation rule and the FedAvg algorithm is
that we exclude a certain number of malicious clients in the
model aggregation step. Our method thus shares the same
convergence property as the FedAvg algorithm [McMahan
et al., 2017; Li et al., 2019e].
4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our spectral
anomaly detection for robust FL in image classification and
sentiment analysis tasks with common ML models over three
public datasets. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our ap-
proach by comparing it with two baseline defense mecha-
nisms as well as the ideal baseline without attacks. Our ex-
periments are implemented with PyTorch. We will release the
source code after the double-blind review process.
4.1 Experiment Setup
In our experiments, we consider a typical FL scenario where
a server coordinates multiple clients. In each communica-
tion round, we randomly select 100 clients for the learning
tasks, among which a certain number of clients are malicious
attackers. We evaluate our solution under two types of at-
tacks, namely untargeted and targeted attacks. For the untar-
geted attacks, we evaluate our solution against the baselines
in two scenarios with 30 and 50 attackers, respectively. For
the targeted backdoor attacks, we assume 30 attackers out of
the selected 100 clients over the FEMNIST and Sentiment140
datasets, and 20 attackers over the MNIST dataset. The de-
tails of the three datasets are given in subsection 4.2. We
consider the following attack types:
Sign-flipping attack. Sign-flipping attack is an untargeted
attack, where the malicious clients flip the signs of their lo-
cal model updates [Li et al., 2019a; Wu et al., 2019]. Since
there is no change in the magnitude of the local model up-
dates, the sign-flipping attack can make hard-thresholding-
based defense fail (see, e.g., [Sun et al., 2019]).
Additive noise attack. Additive noise attack is also an un-
targeted attack, where malicious clients add Gaussian noise to
their local model updates [Li et al., 2019a; Wu et al., 2019].
Note that adding noise can sometimes help protect data pri-
vacy. However, adding too much noise will hurt the model
performance, as demonstrated in Figure 1a.
Backdoor attack. Backdoor attack is targeted attack, a.k.a.
model poisoning attack [Bhagoji et al., 2019; Bagdasaryan et
al., 2019; Sun et al., 2019], aiming to change an ML model’s
behaviours on a minority of data items while maintaining the
primary model performance across the whole testing dataset.
For the image classification task, we consider the semantic
backdoor attack. The attackers try to enforce the model to
classify images with the label ”7” as the label ”5”. For senti-
ment analysis task, we consider the common backdoor attack
case, where malicious clients inject a backdoor text “I ate a
sandwich” in the training data, as illustrated in Figure 5 and
enforce model classify twitters with backdoor text as posi-
tive. The malicious clients adopt model replacement tech-
niques [Bagdasaryan et al., 2019], slightly modifying their
updates so that the attack will not be canceled out by the av-
eraging mechanism of the FedAvg algorithm. Considering
our detection-based mechanism is dynamic and unknown in
apriori during each communication round, the evading strate-
gies, such as [Bagdasaryan et al., 2019] are not applicable.
4.2 Datasets and ML Models
For the image classification tasks, we use MNIST and Fed-
erated Extended MNIST (FEMNIST) datasets. For the senti-
ment analysis task, we use Sentiment140. All three datasets
are widely used benchmarks in the FL literature [Caldas et
al., 2019; Kairouz et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019d]. We consider
a heterogeneous FL setting with non-IID data as follows.
MNIST Following [McMahan et al., 2017], we sort data
samples based on the digit labels and divide the training
dataset into 200 shards, each consisting of 300 training sam-
ples. We assign 2 shards to each client so that most clients
only have examples of two digits, thus simulating a heteroge-
neous setting.
FEMNIST The FEMNIST dataset contains 801, 074 data
samples from 3, 500 writers [Caldas et al., 2019]. This is
already a heterogeneous setting, as each writer represents a
different client.
Sentiment140 The Sentiment140 dataset includes 1.6 bil-
lion tweets twitted by 660, 120 users. Each user is a client.
FL Tasks We train an LR model with the MNIST dataset.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the benchmark schemes and ours. The figures in the first row show the results of the CNN model on the FEMNIST
dataset. The figures in the second row show the results of the LR model on the MNIST dataset. The figures in the third row show the results
of the RNN model on the Sentiment140 dataset. The figures in the first two columns correspond to additive noise attack with 30% and 50%
attackers, respectively. The figures in the last two columns correspond to sign-flipping attack with 30% and 50% attackers, respectively.
With FEMNIST dataset, we train a model with 2 CNN layers
(5x5x32 and 5x5x64), followed by a dense layer with 2048
units. For Sentiment140, we train a one-layer unidirectional
RNN with gated recurrent unit (GRU) cells with 64 hidden
units [Zhang et al., 2020]. We train all three models with test
accuracy comparable to the previous work [Li et al., 2019d;
Caldas et al., 2019; Eichner et al., 2019].
Training Anomaly Detection Model For each of the above
FL tasks, there is a corresponding spectral anomaly detection
model for detecting the malicious clients in FL model train-
ing. We use the test data of the three datasets to generate
the model weights for training the corresponding detection
model. This is done by using the test data to train the same
LR, CNN, and RNN models in a centralized setting and col-
lecting the model weights of each update step. We then use
the collected model weights to train the corresponding detec-
tion model. The trained anomaly detection model is avail-
able to the server when it processes the clients’ updates in FL
model training for each of the above FL tasks.
We choose VAE as our spectral anomaly detection model.
Both the encoder and decoder have two dense hidden lay-
ers with 500 units, and the dimension of the latent vector is
100. The VAE is a generative model, mapping the input to
a distribution from which the low-dimensional embedding is
generated by sampling. The output, i.e., the reconstruction,
is generated based on the low-dimensional embedding and is
done by a decoder [Xu et al., 2018].
4.3 Benchmark Schemes
GeoMed Rather than taking the weighted average of the lo-
cal model updates as done in the FedAvg algorithm [McMa-
han et al., 2017], the GeoMed method generates a global
model update using the geometric median (GeoMed) of the
local model updates (including the malicious ones), which
may not be one of the local model updates [Chen et al., 2017].
Krum Different from GeoMed, the Krum method generates
a global model update using one of the local updates, which
minimizes the sum of distances to its closest neighbors (in-
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Figure 4: Results under backdoor attacks on different datasets.
"I ate a sandwich @leighannirvine hehe, thank you! I might need that ;)"
Figure 5: An example of inserted backdoor text ”I ate a sandwich”.
cluding the malicious ones). The result of the Krum method
is one of the local model updates [Blanchard et al., 2017].
4.4 Results
Experimental results on untargeted attacks, namely sign-
flipping and additive noise attack, are shown in Figure 3.
Our proposed detection-based method (“Ours”) achieves the
best performance in all settings. The performance of Krum
remains the same regardless of the number of malicious at-
tackers and the attack types. The reason is that Krum selects
one of the most appropriate updates. Since each update from
clients in the non-IID setting is biased, the performance loss
cannot be avoided. GeoMed is robust against the additive
noise attack, obtaining satisfactory performance. However, it
fails in the case with the sign-flipping attack, in which ma-
licious attackers try to move the geometric center of all the
updates far from the true one.
The results on targeted attack are illustrated in 4. Our
solution can mitigate the impact of the backdoor attack on
the considered datasets. Note that our method obtains the
best theoretical performance because excluding the malicious
clients indicates that their local data examples cannot be
learned, as illustrated in Figure 4a. It is worthy mentioning
that Krum is robust to the backdoor attack, and GeoMed fails
in defending the backdoor attack on MNIST dataset.
The superior performance of our method comes from the
spectral anomaly detection model, which can successfully
separate benign and malicious clients’ model updates. We list
the F1-Scores of the detection model performance in Table 1
for separating benign and malicious clients is, in essence, a
binary classification task.
4.5 Discussion
We leverage the existing public dataset to train a spectral
anomaly detection model, which is used to detect the mali-
cious clients at the server side and then exclude them dur-
ing FL training processes. The trained detection model can
memorize the feature representation of the unbiased model
updates obtained from public dataset. With this prior knowl-
edge learned by the detection model, we see that it can detect
Dateset
Attack Additive
noise Sign-flipping Backdoor
FEMNIST 1.00 0.97 0.87
MNIST 1.00 0.99 1.00
Sentiment140 1.00 1.00 0.93
Table 1: The F1-Scores of our proposed detection-based method.
the difference between the compact latent representation of
the benign model updates and the compact latent representa-
tion of the malicious model updates. We illustrate this results
in Figure 2. While distortion is unavoidable because of di-
mension reduction, it is clear that the benign model updates
and the malicious model updates can be separated from each
other, especially in the case with sign-flipping attack, where
the benign model updates and the malicious updates are sym-
metric.
The proposed anomaly detection-based method provides
targeted defense in an FL system. Existing defense meth-
ods, such as Krum and GeoMed, provide untargeted defense
because they cannot detect malicious clients. The targeted
defense is necessary for FL because every local dataset may
be drawn from a different distribution, and the defense mech-
anism shall be able to distinguish benign model updates pro-
duced by different datasets from malicious model updates.
Otherwise, the global model would suffer from performance
loss, as illustrated by the model performance with Krum in
Figure 3. We also conduct additional experiments, in which
all clients are benign. Experimental results show that Ge-
oMed and our method introduce very little bias and negligi-
ble performance loss compared to the FedAvg algorithm that
does not consider defense against any attacks.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a spectral anomaly detection based
framework for robust FL, in which spectral anomaly detec-
tion is performed at the server side to detect and remove ma-
licious model updates from adversarial clients. Our method
can accurately detect malicious model updates and eliminate
their impact. We have conducted extensive experiments, and
the numerical results show that our method outperforms the
existing defense-based methods in terms of model accuracy.
Our future work will consider more advanced ML models and
provide more analytical results.
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